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3	SUBJECT: SUMMARY REF	ORT OF A	IRCRAFT ACCIDE	NT - ARTICLE	382
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*	1. CAUSE: UNDELL	THEFT		· 🖍	

- 2. MOST PROBABLE CAUSE: THE AIRCRAFT ENTERED A LOW ALTITUDE, WING LOW STALL WHILE THE PILOT WAS CHECKING AILERON CONTROL WHICH RESULTED IN A SPIN FROM WHICH HE WAS UNABLE TO RECOVER. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE: UNKNOWN FAILURE OF AN AIRCRAFT SYSTEM COMPONENT OR TURBULENCE.
- THE BOARD WAS UNABLE TO FIND ANY IMPROPER ACTION ON THE PART OF THE PILOT OR FAILURE OF MATERIAL TO WHICH THE ACCIDENT COULD BE DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTED. EXPERIENCED U-2 PERSONNEL WERE OF THE OPINION THAT A LOW ALTITUDE, LOW SPEED AILERON CONTROL CHECK AT THE PARTICULAR FLIGHT SEGMENT AT WHICH THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED WOULD BE A NORMAL PROCEDURE IN THE EVENT THE PILOT PLANNED ONLY TO CHECK AILERONS AND THEN RETURN TO THE MLP PATTERN OR PRIOR TO CLIMBING TO A HIGHER ALTITUDE FOR A STALL OR TRIM CHECK.

25X1A 4. WAS PROPERLY QUALIFIED IN THE U-2G AIRCRAFT. HE HAD

TOP SECRET GROWN AUTOMATIC SOUNDERADING AND DELEASE FROM AUTOMATIC SOUNDERADING AND DELEAS

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TO BREAK PATTERN AND CHECK THE AIRCRAFT SINCE THE WING SKID HAD CONTACTED THE RUNWAY SHARPLY. "ROGERED" THIS TRANSMISSION AND ALTERED HIS COURSE (STOPPED HIS LEFT TURN) TO PROCEED

INSTITUTED A LEFT TURN AS IF FOR RE-ENTRY ONTO THE MLP DOWNWIND

LEG (ALT APPROX 400 FEET) THE PILOT WAS INSTRUCTED AT THIS POINT

NORTHWARD. THE AIRCRAFT WAS OBSERVED IN A SHALLOW, LOW POWER CLIMB TO APPROXIMATELY 2500 FEET. ONE WITNESS STATED HE SAW THE AIRCRAFT INITIALLY PITCH UP, ROLL PARTLY IN ONE DIRECTION, REVERSE ROLL IN

TOP SECRET

(CONT-)

25X1A

PACE THREE Approved For Release 2002/06/18: CIA-RDF74B00856R000300030004-1 THE OTHER DIRECTION FROM WHICH POINT IT ENTERED A SPIN. THE REMAINING WITNESSES ALL OBSERVED THE AIRCRAFT IN A LEFT TURN OR SPIN. THE AIRCRAFT CONTACTED THE GOUND IN A NOSE LOW, LEFT WING LOW ATTITUDE TYPICAL OF A SPIN OR SLOW SPIRAL. THE EXTENDED POSITION OF THE SPEED BRAKES MAY BE TAKEN TO INDICATE THAT THE PILOT INSTITUTED A SPIN RECOVERY AND STAYED WITH THE AIRCRAFT UNTIL TOO LATE TO SAFELY EJECT. HIS EJECTION ALTITUDE AS COMPUTED AND CBSERVED BY WITNESSES HAS BEEN PLACED AT 400 FEET.

- 5. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE BOARD RECOMMENDS THAT:
- ACTION BE TAKEN TO CONFIGURE THE AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE IMPROVED STALL CHARACTERISTICS. (SYMMETRICAL WING STALL)
- B. FUEL TANKING BE ARRANGED TO PREVENT FUEL "STACKING" IN YAW AND THAT A VALVE BE PROVIDED IN THE FUEL TRANSFER LINE TO PREVENT CROSS FLOW WHEN THE PUMP IS NOT OPERATING.
- C. AN ALTITUDE BE ESTABLISHED FOR CONTROL AND TRIM CHECKS THAT WILL ASSURE SAFE EJECTION SHOULD AN UNCONTROLLABLE SITUATION BE ENCOUNTERED. ADHERENCE SHOULD BE MANDATORY EXCEPT WHERE SPECIFICALLY WAIVED BY THE COMMANDER.
- D. THE USE OF A "HAMDS OFF" MICROPHONE CAPABILITY BE MADE MANDATORY ON ALL FLIGHTS.
- E. PROJECTIONS BEHIND THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PAVEL (POST LIGHTS) BE ELIMINATED TO PREVENT POSSIBLE FOULING OF EQUIPMENT OR CLOTHING.
- F. WHILE NOT CONSIDERED A FACTOR IN THIS ACCIDENT, IT IS NOTED THAT PILOTS OF THIS ORGANIZATION AVERAGE ONLY TWO FLIGHTS PER MONTH DUE TO LACK OF AVAILABLITY OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT SUFFICIENT AIRCRAFT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE FOUR FLIGHTS PER PILOT PER MONTH.
 - G. LIFE SURVIVAL: (1) U-2 AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITH TOP SECRET (CONT-)

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PAGE FOUR TOP SECRET IN 85617

AN IMPROVED LOW ALTITUDE ESCAPE CAPABILITY.

- (2) THE EJECTION SEAT SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH AN AUTOMATIC PILOT-SEAT SEPARATOR.
- (3) A PROCEDURE OF ASSURING LOW ALTITUDE ATTACHMENT OF THE ZERO-DELAY LANYARD SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED.
 - (4) PILOTS SHOULD FLY WITH FLIGHT SUIT POCKETS CLOSED.
- (5) PILOTS SHOULD BE RE-INDOCTRINATED ON PRESENT ESCAPE LIMITATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

T O P S E C R E T